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THE IDEAL ELEMENT IN LAW
By ROSCOE POUND at Annual Banquet
PHILOSOPHER who wrote a book entitled "The Nature of Existence," felt obliged to write a preliminary
chapter in answer to the question, "Does Anything
Exist?" Very likely a lawyer-like thoroughness requires me
to inquire at the outset whether there is such a thing as an
ideal element in law.
Certainly the analytical jurists of the nineteenth century
did not think so. Their first postulate was formulated thus
by Bentham: "Law or the law * * * is an abstract or collective term which * * * can mean nothing more nor less
than the sum total of a number of individual laws taken together." Accordingly the analytical jurist proceeds to define
"a law" and, having done so, conceives he has defined "law."
Moreover, since the seventeenth century, in this mode of
thinking, "a law" has been taken to be a rule-a rule authoritatively prescribed by the lawmaker or authoritatively received by usage or tradition. As Blackstone puts it, a law is "a
rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a
state;" as Holland puts it, "a general rule of external human
action enforced by a sovereign political authority;" as Gray
puts it, law is made up of "the rules in accordance with which
the courts of [a] * * * society determine cases, and by
which, therefore, the members of that society are to govern
themselves."
What is meant by the word "rule" in these formulas?
In a narrower sense it means a precept prescribing some definite
detailed legal consequence for a definite detailed fact or state of
facts. Such rules are the staple of primitive codes. For example:
In the Code of Hammurabi: "If a man strike a free man
he shall pay ten shekels of silver."
In the Roman Twelve Tables: "If the father sell the son
three times, let the son be free from the father."
In the Anglo-Saxon Laws (Laws of Ethelbert): "If
there be seizing by the hair, let there be fifty scaetts for bote."
In the Salic law: "If any person shall have called another
'fox' he shall be sentenced to three shillings."
Penal codes are full of such rules. Also in modern times
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they make up a large part of the law of commercial transactions and of the law of property. Foe example:
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, §124, '11; "Where
a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against
a party who has himself made, authorized, or assented to the
alteration and subsequent indorsers."
New York Real Property Law, §45: "When a remainder
is created on any such life estate, and more than two persons
are named as the persons during whose lives the life estate. shall
continue, the remainder shall take effect on the death of the
two persons first named, as if no other lives had been introduced."
This is the narrower meaning of the word "rule," and certainly law is much more than an aggregate of rules in that
sense.
But there is a wider sense of the term "rule" in which
it means a norm or pattern of conduct in general, including
rules in the narrower sense, and all authoritative guides to conduct or decision having the power of the tribunals of the state
behind them. In this sense it means any authoritative pattern
of or guide to legal or judicial reasoning or judicial action, and
hence to private conduct. By a bit of logical acrobatics law
may be made out to be a body of rules in this sense. It is my
thesis, however, that even so the conception of law as an aggregate of laws is inadequate.
At the outset we must make certain distinctions. For one
thing, we must distinguish "law" in the sense of a body of
authoritative materials of judicial and administrative action
(e. g., the law of England, the Roman law) and law in the
sense of the legal order-the regime of social control through
politically organized society-as when we speak of respect for
law or of law and order. Likewise we must distinguish law in
the former sense from what it is now fashionable to call the
judicial process. That phrase, too, has more than one sense.
Sometimes it means only the process of reaching a decision in
a particular case. At other times, and where the doctrine of
judicial precedent obtains, it means the process of determining
the legal precept to be established by the decision of a particular case. In that event, the process of determining the pre-
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cept is a decisive element in arriving at the decision. At other
times it means a generalization of the two preceding and consequent picture of how judicial decisions in general are or
ought to be arrived at. Obviously law does not include everything which enters into or determines the judicial process.
However we define the phrase, everything which enters into
the process, or even the received ideal of the process, is not law.
Many things besides law enter into the actual administration
of justice. Law, in the lawyer's sense, is a highly specialized
means for giving uniformity and predictability to the process
and thus maintaining the general security.
There has been endless debate as to the nature and the
definition of law. In a sense, as Yellowplush said of spelling- "every gentleman is entitled to his own"-so we may
say of definitions of law that every jurist may have his own.
My thesis today is that for the lawyer's purposes law is a
body of precepts and received ideals and a received technique
of using them established or recognized by a politically organized society as the authoritative basis of judicial and administrative action.
So regarded law is something much more complex than
the simple aggregate of rules conceived by the analytical jurists
of the last century. From this standpoint we must recognize
no less than three elements in a body of developed law, and
must recognize that one of those elements is made up of a
number of constituents.
First, we must put the precept element or elements of
rules in the wider sense. This is a body of norms or patterns of
decision, or prescribings as to conduct, which therefore are
to serve as norms of decision, some traditional and some established by legislation. These precepts call for or imply an application of the force of politically organized society in case
certain facts or states of fact are made to appear. They are
the authoritative materials of judicial action, the raw materials, one might say, to which the judicial process is applied.
But these materials are not all of one sort. We may profitably
distinguish rules (in the narrower sense), principles, conceptions, and standards.
Rules (in the narrower sense) have been spoken of already. They are precepts prescribing some definite detailed
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legal consequence for a definite detailed state of facts. A primitive body of law is made up of such precepts. Ancient codes
are made up of a series of minutely detailed rules of this sort.
In the tariffs of compositions in which they abound one finds
not infrequently an enumeration of every member of the human body in the minutest detail, in the Anglo-Saxon law
coming down to "for every nail a shilling." Because they are
so detailed, there is the greatest diversity of such rules on the
same subject in different jurisdictions. Also they are very short
lived, seldom surviving in our law for much more than a
generation.
Principles are authoritative starting points for legal reasoning. It is worth a moment's digression to note how they
evolve. In primitive law there comes to be a stage in which a
sacred or authoritative text or a supposedly immutable body
of declared custom is the basis of administering justice. If
there is a sacred or unalterable text, one way of meeting new
situations of fact or new ways of looking at old situations is
to correct the text. The text does not admit of change, but it
may be discovered that the inscriptions or manuscripts in
which the text is preserved contain errors and a corrected text
may do in effect what we should do today by amendment. In
this process we have a germ of legislation, on the one hand,
and of legal reasoning, on the other. Another starting point
may be seen in the crude interpretation of the beginnings of
Roman law. Where the oak tree of one Roman was so near
the adjoining land of another that acorns fell upon the latter's
land, the Twelve Tables allowed the owner of the tree to go
on his neighbor's land at certain times and under certain conditions to gather the acorns. This was extended to fruits of
all kinds by the simple device of interpreting the word
"acorn" as meaning "fruit." Again, an action was provided
when one cut down his neighbor's trees. This was made to
cover grapevines by a similar interpretation of the word
"1trees." When law ceases to be a priestly tradition, when it
becomes secularized and comes into the hands of professional
lawyers, legal reasoning takes the place of such crude processes.
Lawyers begin to work upon the authoritative materials
by what is called in our old books "putting differences" or
"taking diversities"-the first method of a science of law.
They find a difference between two texts or two cases super-

DICTA

229

ficially alike and a general proposition or principle behind that
difference and formulate the principle in a maxim. By development of this process we get legal principles, that is, generalized propositions as authoritative starting points for legal
reasoning.
Some examples from Roman law are: Once an heir always an heir; no one can transfer more than he has; no one
should be enriched unjustly at the expense of another. Some
examples from our law are: Liability flows from fault; once
a mortgage always a mortgage; one who does anything on its
face injurious to another must answer for the consequences.
Such propositions, it will be noted, are not rules. They are
premises from which to deduce rules.
Legal principles enable the law to cover much which
could not be provided for by rules in the narrower sense and
distinguish law in the lawyer's sense from the undifferentiated
social control which obtains before law but is called law by
the historical jurists.
Conceptions are generalized categories to which particular states of fact may be referred. If the facts are found to
come within such a category, then certain rules, principles, and
standards become applicable. Examples in Roman law are,
sale, mandate transaction of strict law, transaction of good
faith; in the civil law, legal transaction, the most fruitful conception in the law; in our law, trust, bailment, fiduciary relation. Here the legal precept is to apply the rules, principles and
standards attaching to the conception, in case the facts come
within it. Conceptions are the significant type in the maturity
of law. They are chiefly the work of law teachers and law
writers. In the nineteenth century judges and jurists struggled
hard to put all law in terms of them.
Legal standards define certain limits of conduct and are
authoritative guides to the valuation of conduct, to be applied
not absolutely, as in the case of rules in the narrower sense,
but in view of the circumstances of each case. Here the legal
precept imposes liability if the standard is departed from or
is not lived up to. One departs from or exceeds or falls short
of it at his peril of answering to any one injured. Examples
are: In the Roman law, the standard of the just and diligent
head of a household, the standard of proper use by a usufructuary, the standard of a just man in transactions of good
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faith; in our law, the standard of fair conduct of a fiduciary,
the standard of the reasonably prudent man, the standard of
reasonable service, reasonable facilities and reasonable incidental facilities on the part of a public utility, and the standard of fairness in competition.
These standards come into the law in what I have been
wont to call the stage of equity and natural law. They have a
certain moral flavor and are individualized in their application
just as are moral precepts. They are a scientific way of achieving an individualization of application of law. They take the
place in developed law which in primitive law is taken by the
dispensing power of the king, or what in the beginnings of
French law was called equity-a permissible relaxation of application of rules in particular cases. Legal standards are a
great advance over these things, and over the power of popular
assembly tribunals to override the law as, for example, at
Athens. They fix the cases where relaxation or flexibility of
application are called for consistently with the general security, and fix the limits of that relaxation and flexibility.
These four types, rules in the narrower sense, principles,
conceptions and standards, make up the precept element,
which analytical jurists have taken for the whole of the law.
But this precept element is by no means the whole of the body
of authoritative legal materials which are the basis of judicial
and administrative action. It is not the whole of the authoritative apparatus by which justice is administered every day in
the courts.
Second, there is the technique element-a traditional authoritative technique of finding the grounds of decision in the
mass of precepts both statutory and traditional; a technique
of developing the grounds of decision of particular cases out
of the authoritative materials; a technique of shaping rules
to meet new situations, of developing principles to meet new
cases, and of working out from the whole body of legal materials the precepts appropriate to the concrete situation before the tribunal. This element is, as it were, the art of the
lawyer's craft. It is this element which is decisive in characterizing the two great legal systems of the modern world,
the common law and the civil law. There is no uniformity of
precepts in the common-law world nor in the civil-law world.
In England, the real property of an intestate passes to the per-
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sonal representative. In Oklahoma, the personal property of
an intestate passes to the heir. Yet English lawyer and Oklahoma lawyer understand each other as perfectly as each fails
to understand the French or the Latin-American lawyer.
Common law and civil law have many precepts in common
and many institutions in common. Where they differ decisively is in their technique.
An example may be seen in the respective attitude of the
common law and the civil law toward statutes and judicial
decisions. In the technique of the common law a statute furnishes a rule for a particular situation. But it does not furnish
general legal principles to be developed into rules or premises
to be made the basis of legal reasoning. A common-law court
reasons by analogy from judicial decisions but not from statutes. On the other hand, in the civil law single judicial decisions have no authority. A settled course of judicial decision
upon some point fixes the rule for that particular point. But
nothing more. The civilian finds principles in legislation. He
reasons by analogy from sections of codes. His attitude toward the course of judicial decision is that of the commonlaw lawyer toward a statute. His attitude toward a legislative provision is that of a common-law lawyer toward judicial decisions. To put the matter concretely, we may compare judicial treatment of Lord Campbell's Act in commonlaw jurisdictions with a similar situation in the civil law.
Lord Campbell's Act is probably as universal a bit of legislation in common-law countries as could be thought of. It prevails everywhere. Yet courts even today treat it as introducing an exceptional, one almost might say, anomalous, isolated
rule into the body of the law. Thus if A hits B on the head
with a club and does no more than injure him, in an action
for assault and battery the burden is upon A to justify. It
is enough for B to show that A hit him. If, however, A succeeds in killing B, and an action is brought by B's representative under Lord Campbell's Act, the burden is upon the plaintiff not only to show that A hit B, but that he caused the
death wrongfully. In civil-law countries, as with us, the law
starts out with the proposition that no price is to be put upon
human life, but the edict de dejectis et dilfusis provided a
penalty in cases where someone was killed by things thrown
out or poured out from a building. The penalty became a
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penalty of reparation of the damage to persons interested in
the life of the one killed, and by analogy all cases of wrongful killing became actionable.
This technique element is the work of lawyers, and is
the most enduring element and the slowest to change in the
law. In Roman law it developed from the late Republic to
the third century. It was perfected by the teachers in the law
schools of the late Empire in the fifth century, and it has been
pretty much the same from the fifth century to the present.
In the common law it developed from the thirteenth century
to the seventeenth in the courts of Westminster. It was perfected in the eighteenth century and has been pretty much the
same throughout the English-speaking world since the time
of Blackstone.
Third, there is the ideal element; a body of received
ideals of the social order, and so of the legal order; a body of
received authoritative ideals of what law is and what law is
for, and so of what legal precepts ought to be and how they
ought to be applied in the light thereof. These ideals, not always as clearly differentiated from the personal ideals of particular judges as they should be, are the background of all
judicial action, whether in finding the law-i. e., finding the
applicable precept for a particular case--or in interpreting it,
or in applying it. Good illustrations of the Operation of the
ideal element may be seen in the decisions upon the Married
Women's Acts in the fore part of the nineteenth century, and
the earlier decisions upon Workmen's Compensation or Employer's Liability Acts in the present century. To this day the
law as to legal transactions of married women is made difficult by the attitude taken by the courts when these acts first
came before them. It is significant to compare the way in
which the operation of these statutes was held down, as in
derogation of the common law, with the willingness of the
courts to go even beyond the letter of the statutes in giving
effect to laws abrogating or altering rules of the feudal property law. The ideal of an American society, in the minds of
the judges, pictured a simple ownership of land, freely transferable, as the chief asset of a pioneer society, relieved of rules
appropriate to a society ruled by great landowners, and devolving at death in the same way in which personal property
was distributed. It also pictured women as in the home, not

DICTA

233

about in the world entering into all manner of legal transactions. The one set of statutes conformed to the picture and
was given the fullest effect. The other did not and was held
down in operation. Both were in derogation of the common
law. But it is significant that the doctrine of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law was not
applied to the laws which overhauled the law of real property and purged it of archaisms. Married Women's Acts were
no more radical in their departure from the common law than
the statutes which made over descent of land. The difference
in judicial treatment is not to be explained by the commonlaw canons of interpretation.
When Married Women's Acts first came before the
courts, they were looked at jealously with respect to rights of
husbands, just as Workmen's Compensation and Employer's
Liability Acts were at first held unconstitutional for want of
due process of law as infringing the liberty and taking away
the property of employers. It would have been quite possible
to uphold Married Women's Acts as adopting the equitable
as against the common-law view with respect to the property
of married women, and so not depriving husbands of substantial vested rights, but giving the substantial claims of the
wife better security than could be afforded in equity. That
seems to have been the theory on which the statutes were
drawn. The pioneer statute was entitled "An Act for the
More Effectual Protection of the Property of Married Women." In the same way, the Workmen's Compensation and
Employer's Liability Acts might have been upheld, as in the
event they came to be, on more than one common-law
analogy, notably that of liability without fault for the torts
of a servant or agent. In each case the courts were moved to
choose one starting point rather than the other by an ideal
of the social and legal order with which the statutes were felt
to be out of accord.
It is only by a straining which is not worth while that
the three elements in law, the three elements in the authoritative materials governing or guiding judicial and administrative action, may be reduced to rule even in the wider sense.
Indeed, it gives a wholly wrong picture of this body of authoritative materials to put it in terms of an aggregate of rules
and take rules in the narrower sense as the type. The nine-
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teenth century strove for an impossible degree of absolute
certainty in judicial and administrative action, and rule in
the narrower sense in which a definite, detailed legal consequence is prescribed for every definite, detailed state of facts, is
the simplest and most obvious case of such certainty of application. Given the exact state of facts, the exact measure
of action is at hand and calls for nothing but mechanical application. A very great part of the administration of justice
undoubtedly does go on in this way. Otherwise courts could
not dispose of their enormous dockets consistently with the
requirements of the economic order. But very significant parts
of the administration of justice do not and cannot go on in
this simple way.
There are two other reasons for the nineteenth century
attempt to reduce law to an aggregate of rules. One is that
the analytical jurists took statute for the type of law. They
had inherited the command idea of law from Byzantine legal
science by way of Justinian and by way of the academic study
of Roman law in the twelfth century universities. Another
is that the leading English and American analytical jurists
were real property lawyers. John Austin was a chancery barrister at the time when the courts of equity were chiefly concerned with family settlements and the learning of future interests in land with all its intricacies had passed from the
Court of Common Pleas to the Court of Chancery. John
Shipman Gray was our leading American authority upon the
law of real property, and in particular upon the law of future interests in land. Rules in the narrower sense are the
staple of the land law because of the call for stability of titles
involved in the social interest in security of acquisitions.
Analytical jurists strove hard in the last century to exclude the ideal element from the law. They deemed it destructive of certainty to admit the existence of anything but a body
of positive precepts. Yet the importance of the ideal element
in the work of tribunals is decisive even in the law of property. For example, in a comparatively recent case in Missouri
the highest court of that state held that primogeniture in
estates tail was "contrary to the theory on which this and
other commonwealths were built." The statute read: "And
the remainder shall pass in fee simple absolute to the person to
whom the estate tail would at the death of the first grantee,
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devisee, or donee in tail first pass according to the course of
the common law." Such a provision had been held in Massachusetts to adopt primogeniture, giving the first taker an estate
for life and the common-law heir in tail a fee simple. The
Missouri court did not follow these decisions nor did it follow
the clear language of the statute which provided for a remainder in fee to the common-law heir in tail. Instead it fell back
upon an ideal of the nature of American institutions and
shaped the statutory provision to agree therewith.
But the most striking illustrations of the ideal element
in action are to be found in our constitutional law. Take, for
example, the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
What fixed the content of the historically given phrase "due
process of law"? It was not analysis. That would at most
have extended the phrase to procedure. It was not history.
The develpoment of the power of courts with respect to arbitrary interference with the liberty or property of the subject
or citizen down to Coke's Second Institute and thence to the
Constitution of the United States extended only to executive
attempts to do the things committed to the legislature. The
decisive factor in construing the Fourteenth Amendment was
an ideal of a politically organized society in which all activities were measured by reason and every personal element was
excluded or held down by general precepts or patterns of action. This ideal has shaped the whole interpretation and
application of the clause as to due process of law.
Received ideals which are part of the authoritative materials of judicial action are of two kinds. First, there are ideals
of the social order, of the end of law, such, for example, as the
ideal of "a free government," or of "free institutions," or of
"American institutions," so constantly invoked in the fore
part of the nineteenth century. Thus in a well known case
Mr. Justice Miller said: "The theory of our governments,
state and national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited
power anywhere." Such ideals are frequently made into a
sort of super-constitution by which legislation is judged.
Second, there are ideals of the authoritative materials of
decision, that is, ideals of whence these materials are derived
and what they are in substance as distinguished from form.
For example, in the eighteenth century generally and in the
fore part of the nineteenth century in the United States the
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natural law ideal obtained. There was an ideal of a complete universal model code or body of rules, given by reason,
and of a body of received or established precepts as simply
declaratory thereof. Hence it followed that if a tribunal
could find a better statement of a proposition of law, that is,
a statement more nearly conforming to the universal model
code than that contained in the positive law of the time and
place, it was at liberty to, indeed it was its duty to, adopt that
better formulation. Thus in a case in the highest court of
New York about the middle of the last century the question
was as to whether a statue and a sun dial had become fixtures.
The opinion of the majority of the court goes into a long discussion of French authorities and says: "I think the French
law as applicable to statuary is in accordance with reason and
justice." Being in accordance with reason and justice, it was
taken to be declaratory of natural law and so was taken over
as the law of New York, notwithstanding the constitutional
provision adopting the common law as the system in that
state. The court paid no attention to the common-law authorities. The French doctrine as a sound exposition of the
ideally just rule was a better formulation of something of
which both English and New York law were to be merely
declaratory.
If the ideal element in the law of the time and place were
as well organized, had as much definiteness, and were subjected to a critique as assured and thorough as that to which
the apparatus of rules and doctrines has long been subjected, it
would not be the source of confusion which we much admit it
to be today. Very likely if analytical jurisprudence had gone
on to treat this element as it did the precept element in the last
century, analytical jurists would have no concern to cast it
out of the law. Unhappily, philosophical jurisprudence has
been under a cloud for a century, and this part of our authoritative legal materials has been neglected. In consequence the
line between received ideals which are part of the law and
subjective ideals of the particular judge or particular tribunal
has not always been drawn, and indeed at times is not easy to
draw carefully. An example of the extent to which an idealizing of the legal institutions of the time and place may become a universal measure may be seen in the treatment of the
Enoch Arden situation by two great judges, Lord Holt and
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Mr. Justice Miller. Each had occasion to speak of limitations
upon legislative power. Lord Holt said that undoubtedly
there were such limitations. There were things which Parliament could not do, but one thing which it could do was to
enact that A, who was the wife of B, on and after a certain
date should cease to be the wife of B and should be the wife
of C. Mr. Justice Miller, discussing the same question, said:
"There are limitations on such power which grow out of the
essential nature of all free governments. Implied reservations
of individual rights, without which the social compact could
not exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled
to the name. No court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A and B who were
husband and wife to each other should be so no longer, but
that A should thereafter be the husband of C, and B the wife
of D. Or which should enact that the homestead now owned
by A should no longer be his, but should henceforth be the
property of B." When in a lecture some years ago I had occasion to mention this difference of opinion, a judge of one of
our state courts wrote me an indignant letter saying that no
such statute would be tolerated in any Christian civilized
land. In reply I was able to remind him that a statute in
almost those very words was enacted in Indiana in 1842,
that such statutes are still being enacted in Canada, that they
were common in England down to 1859, and that in his own
state they had been enacted until after the middle of the nineteenth century. As Mark Twain said of the judgment of
Solomon, the explanation lies in the way Solomon was raised.
Lord Holt sat upon the bench in a land in which legislative
divorce was familiar. Mr. Justice Miller was familiar with a
polity in which there was a sharp distinction between judicial
and legislative power and legislative divorce had long become
obsolete or forbidden by constitutional provisions.
Today received ideals are in flux and the line between
authoritative ideals and the personal ideals of particular
iudges is much more than usually hazy, and the results have
put law and its application much at large in some important
fields of judicial and administrative action. Hence many, who
think of law in terms of the precept element, are becoming
skeptical of the existence or possibility of a legal order in
which judicial action is held to uniform and predictable lines.
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What is needed is not destructive criticism of judicial action
in a stage of transition, but a constructive theory of the neglected element of the law in which lies the mischief.
Analytical jurisprudence and historical jurisprudence,
which organize and criticize and enable us to understand the
precept element and the technique element must be supplemented by a philosophical jurisprudence which shall organize
and criticize the ideal element and bring us to distinguish authoritative, received ideals from subjective ideals. When received ideals are universally received, there is little or no need
of philosophical jurisprudence. In the reign of an idea of free
competitive and acquisitive self-assertion as the ideal of the
highest good in nineteenth-century America, we could get
along well enough with no conscious philosophy of law.
When legally received ideals cease or cease largely to reflect
current ideals of the social order, or are out of touch with the
actual social order, confusion of authoritative with personal
ideals becomes acute and results in 5-4 decisions and the other
phenomena of unpredictable legal action on which so much

stress is being laid today.
When received ideals are breaking down and new ones

have not yet become authoritative, we must expect for a time
judicial groping, dissents, vacillation, and a blundering search
for workable solutions of new problems.

PERSONAL MENTION
Noah Alter and Samuel Chutkow are now associated in practice
as Chutkow F4 Alter at 846 Equitable Building, Denver.

. Harold E. Popham, formerly Deputy District Attorney for the
City and County of Denver, has tendered his resignation effective June
15th and will return to private practice.
Joseph E. Cook, Deputy District Attorney, has been assigned to
handle all Juvenile Court matters for the District Attorney's office.

